• Click on the titles of individual talks for abstract, slides and archived video (available approximately one week after the conclusion of the workshop).

Please note that this schedule is subject to change. All events take place in the Calvin Lab Auditorium.

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Coffee and Check-In
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Opening Remarks
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The Emergent Structure of Simple Behaviors in Complex Networks
Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research New England
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Break
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Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings
Shuchi Chawla, University of Wisconsin-Madison
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Timing “Versus” Matching: Thickness and Information in Dynamic Markets
Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University
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Lunch
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On Maximizing Revenue for Multi-Item Auctions
Andrew Yao, Tsinghua University
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Break
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Simple Mechanisms for a (Sub)Additive Buyer
Matt Weinberg, Princeton University
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Algorithmic Bayesian Mechanism Design
Yang Cai, McGill University
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Reception
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Coffee and Check-In
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The Substitution Metric and the Performance of Clock Auctions
Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
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Break
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Privacy, Substitutes, and Optimization in Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions
Ilya Segal, Stanford University
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Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Shengwu Li, Stanford University
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Lunch
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Non-Revelation Mechanism Design: Inference, Optimization, and Approximation
Jason Hartline, Northwestern University
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Econometrics for Learning Agents
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Microsoft Research
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Break
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Group Discussion about Future Directions
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Coffee and Check-In
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Smoothness and Pricing: Near-Optimal Outcomes in Markets Large and Small
Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research
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Break
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Complexity in AGT Update: Nash Approximability and Simultaneous Auctions
Christos Papadimitriou, UC Berkeley
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Competition and Simple Auctions
Mallesh Pai, University of Pennsylvania
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Lunch
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Consensus Expectations and Conventions
Ben Golub, Harvard University
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Break
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Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
Sigal Oren, Ben Gurion University
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Decision Making at Scale: Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Platforms
Ashish Goel, Stanford University
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Coffee and Check-In
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Ben Brooks, University of Chicago
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Break
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The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria
Sergiu Hart, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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On the Borders of Border’s Theorem
Noam Nisan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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Lunch
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Strong Duality for a Multiple Good Monopolist
Christos Tzamos, MIT
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Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Mechanism Design
Gabriel Carroll, Stanford University
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Break
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Panel Discussion
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Coffee and Check-In
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Selling Experiments
Dirk Bergemann, Yale University 
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Break
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The Sample Complexity of Revenue Maximization
Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University
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How Well Do Prices Coordinate Markets
Aaron Roth, University of Pennsylvania
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Lunch
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Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination
Nima Haghpanah, MIT
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Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation
Shahar Dobzinski, Weizmann Institute of Science