Abstract
Breakout Session Track #1
Speaker: Vanessa Teague, University of Melbourne
Title: End-to-end verifiable voting in a state election
Abstract: Electronic voting computations clearly need to be verifiable, in the sense of providing a public proof that all encrypted votes have been correctly counted. The e-voting literature also includes interesting protocols for ensuring that a voter (who cannot perform cryptographic computations directly) can nevertheless gain some evidence that her vote has been cast as she intended. We describe a system with both these kinds of verifiability, based on the Prêt à Voter end-to-end verifiable voting system. The system ran successfully in the state election in Victoria (Australia) in November 2014, taking a total of 1121 votes from supervised polling places inside Victoria and overseas.
Joint work with Craig Burton, Chris Culnane, Peter Y A Ryan and Steve Schneider.
Breakout Session Track #2
Brief Announcements
Breakout Session Track #3
Brief Announcements