Weak-to-Strong Generalization

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Models are getting smart



[Kiela et al. 2023]

Model behavior is becoming increasingly difficult to evaluate

Training, evals, monitoring ...











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Core challenge: Humans will be too weak to evaluate superhuman models

How do we study this today?

Traditional ML



Supervisor Student

Traditional ML

Superalignment



Supervisor S

Student

Supervisor Student

Traditional ML

Superalignment



Supervisor S

Student

Supervisor Student

Our Analogy

Human level



Supervisor

Student

Experimental Procedure Today

For a task **T**:

1. Weak

a. Finetune weak pretrained model on **T** w/ **gold** labels b. Weak labels = predictions on held-out data

2. Weak-to-strong

a. Finetune strong pretrained model on **T** w/ weak labels

3. Strong

a. Finetune strong pretrained model on **T** w/ **gold** labels

Performance Gap Recovered (PGR)



Goal: Recover PGR ~1

Applications

1. Superhuman reward model

 \rightarrow train models to behave safely \rightarrow elicit strong capabilities

1. Superhuman safety classifier

 \rightarrow catch unsafe behavior at test time

Results

Tasks



Binary classification







Multiclass

Tasks



Binary classification



We use pretrained GPT-4-base models.



Multiclass















Finetuning results

Almost Universally: 0 < PGR < 1



Bootstrapping



Instead of GPT-2 \rightarrow GPT-4 do GPT-2 \rightarrow GPT-3 \rightarrow GPT-3,5 \rightarrow GPT-4

Helps on chess, small improvement on NLP, none on RMs.

0.1 weak model compute (fraction of GPT4) 10-7

 $L(f) = \mathbf{CE}(f(x), f_w(x))$

Weak supervisor predictions

$$L(f) = \operatorname{CE}(f(x), f_w(x))$$

Idea: add a regularization towards the strong model's own predictions: $L_{\text{conf}}(f) = \text{CE}(f(x), (1 - \alpha) \cdot f_w(x))$

- a grows from 0 to 0.5 during first 20% of training
- $\hat{f}_t(x)$ is hard labels from the strong model adjusted to be class-balanced

leak supervisor predictions

$$f(x) + \alpha \cdot \hat{f}_t(x))$$

Strong student predictions

$$L(f) = \operatorname{CE}(f(x), f_w(x))$$

Idea: add a regularization towards the strong model's own predictions: $L_{\text{conf}}(f) = \text{CE}(f(x), (1 - \alpha) \cdot f_w(x))$

 $\mathbf{1}$

 $L_{\text{conf}}(f) = (1 - \alpha) \cdot \text{CE}(f(x), f_w(x)) + \alpha \cdot \text{CE}(f(x), \hat{f}_t(x))$

Reinforces confidence in strong model's predictions

Veak supervisor predictions

$$f(x) + \alpha \cdot \hat{f}_t(x))$$

Strong student predictions



Major improvements in NLP, up to 80% PGR







Doesn't help on RMs.

Understanding

Weak supervisor imitation



• Intuitively, strong models should imitate weak model mistakes

Weak supervisor imitation



- Intuitively, strong models should imitate weak model mistakes
- We see it in practice

Weak supervisor imitation



- Intuitively, strong models should imitate weak model mistakes
- We see it in practice
- Early-stopping can help significantly

Imitation: student-supervisor agreement



- % of test inputs where student and supervisor make the same prediction
- Agreement > weak accuracy
- Confidence loss reduces agreement

Imitation: student-supervisor agreement



- % of test inputs where student and supervisor make the same prediction
- Agreement > weak accuracy
- Confidence loss reduces agreement
- Inverse scaling!

Salience: few-shot baseline



- For large models, 5-shot is competitive with finetuning
- Eliciting what these models know can be straightforward

ining orward

Salience: few-shot baseline



- Few-shot prompting with weak labels \Rightarrow qualitatively similar to FT
- Aux confidence loss >> few-shot

Salience: generative finetuning



- Make the target concept more salient by generative finetuning
- Significantly improves PGR in RMs

Salience: generative finetuning



- Make the target concept more salient by generative finetuning
- Significantly improves PGR in RMs
- Generative FT + cheating ES \Rightarrow 30-40% PGR

Discussion

Limitations

- Single forward pass classification
- Most model knowledge today intuitively comes from observing similar knowledge on the internet; future models may be different
- Future models may be better at imitating people, which could make "imitating humans" a more likely failure mode in the future

Future Work

Controlling how models generalize

The desired generalization satisfies properties:

- Doesn't just imitate weak supervision
- "Natural" or "salient" to the model
- Satisfies many consistency properties

How do we trust the results?

Can we tell if a model is generalizing OOD in the wrong way even without (reliable) labels?

Lots more basic science to do

- Why are RM results worse?
- What makes a capability easy/hard to elicit?
- How important are errors in the weak labels?

Conclusion

Summary

- Weak supervisors can elicit capabilities beyond their own
- ...but still can't elicit everything stronger models know
- Many open questions



Superalignment

Supervisor

Student